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POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS IN PENNSYLVANIA:
"JOINT" POSSESSION
INTRODUCTION
Possession of narcotic drugs has been a crime in Pennsylvania
since 1917.' Although a narcotics possession statute has long been
in existence in this state, Pennsylvania courts have failed to clarify
the exact nature of the possession outlawed by the statute. Con-
sequently, it is impossible to ascertain with precision what con-
duct constitutes culpable possession. This lack of a comprehen-
sive delineation can in part be attributed to the scarcity of perti-
nent appellate decisions both in Pennsylvania and in most other
states.2 Two notable exceptions are Illinois and California, 3 which
as a result of many narcotics possession decisions, have developed
a more concrete notion of what constitutes the "possession" re-
quired to convict. Although Pennsylvania's problems cannot be
solved simply by a wholesale appropriation of the narcotics pos-
session doctrines of California or Illinois,' the law of these and other
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4 (1961).
The following acts and the causing thereof within the Common-
wealth are hereby prohibited:
(q) The possession, control, dealing in, dispensing, selling,
delivery, distribution, prescription, trafficking in, or giving
of, any dangerous or narcotic drug.
2. An explanation for this scarcity of appellate decisions in narcotics
possession cases may be that many defendants do not bother to appeal
because they are given suspended sentences in the lower courts. In an
A.L.R. annotation covering the construction of the word "possession" in the
46 states (not including Pennsylvania) in which the UNwomV NARCOTIC
DRUG ACT is in force, the author conceded that:
[W]hat constitutes a sufficient external relationship between the
defendant and the narcotic property to complete the concept of pos-
session is a question which is not susceptible of a short gen-
eralized answer.
Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810, 811 (1963). The annotator, true to his word, does
not give an answer in the cases he has collected.
3. Washington also has a well developed line of possession cases
under their narcotics statute. See 46 WASH. L. REv. 555 (1971).
4. For one thing, the California statute, CAL. HEALTH & SAFEY CODE
§§ 11500, 11530 (West 1971), is unique in that the word "control" does not
appear, whereas in the statutes of every other state (including Pennsyl-
vania) both "possession" and "control" appear. Therefore, California case
law, because it arises under a statute which differs in this regard from
that of Pennsylvania, is not directly applicable to Pennsylvania cases.
Also, the cases in California and Illinois (and Washington) are in conflict
with the Pennsylvania decisions in some of the specific areas where
Pennsylvania narcotics possession doctrine has become settled. See text
accompanying notes 112, 114 infra.
jurisdictions should be consulted to fill the holes in the Pennsyl-
vania narcotics possession law where the courts of this state have
been silent. Considering, therefore, the case law in this and other
jurisdictions, this Comment will present the current Pennsylvania
position and suggest what changes should be made with regard
to the factors which courts have considered in deciding whether a
given relationship between a person and a thing amounts to "pos-
session" sufficient to convict.
I. THE Cuszio DEFINITION OF POSSESSION
Philosophic exploration of the concept of possession has not
been a favored topic among the writers or the courts in this coun-
try in recent years. 5 The tendency has been to accept broad,
simple definitions of possession or to avoid definition altogether.
For instance, in a case decided under the Narcotics Act of 19176
the Pennsylvania superior court ruled that it was not error for the
trial court to fail to define "possession."17 The superior court held
that "possession" did not have to be defined in the charge and that
the word "possession" as used in the act was not a term of art,
having instead the common meaning which is generally under-
stood." Apparently the court did not mean the generally under-
stood dictionary definition of "possession," 9 but rather the gener-
ally understood legal connotation of "possession," since the Penn-
sylvania cases have always used the definition devised by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Curzio.'0
In Curzio "possession" was defined under the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act" as the "power of control and intent to control."' 2 This
definition is the standard one in narcotics possession cases in Penn-
sylvania.'
3
5. On the other hand, the metaphysics of possession is a perennial
favorite in England. See, for instance, Goodhart, Possession of Drugs
and Absolute Liability, 84 LAW. Q. REv. 382 (1968).
6. Act of July 11, 1917, No. 282, §§ 1-16 [1917] Pa. Laws 758, as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780 (1961).
7. Commonwealth v. Bozzi, 178 Pa. Super. 224, 116 A.2d 290 (1955).
8. Id. at 229, 116 A.2d at 292. See also Commonwealth v. Yaple,
217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970).
9. Act or state of possessing; ownership; control; also, the state of
being possessed. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1953).
10. 170 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1948).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V, 1969), amending 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
12. United States v. Curzio, 170 F.2d 354, 357 (3d Cir. 1948). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 216, (1964). "[A] person who is in
'possession of a chattel' is one who has physical control of the chattel with
the intent to exercise such control on his own behalf, or on behalf of
another."
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Townsend, 428 Pa. 281, 237 A.2d 192
(1968); Commonwealth v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d 922 (1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 841 (1961); Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330,
144 A.2d 580 (1958); Commonwealth v. Salvaterra, 60 Luz. L. Reg. 79
(Pa. C.P. 1970); Commonwealth v. Cardelli, 18 Bucks 504 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
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The Curzio definition, however, requires that "control" be de-
fined.14 In Bryant v. State the Maryland Court of Appeals has
held that when the word "control" appears in the statute, it must
be given its ordinary meaning.15 The Maryland Court of Appeals
in the same case quoted the Webster's Dictionary definition of
"control": "to exercise restraining or directing influence over."1
Incorporating the definition of "control" into the Curzio formula,
possession in narcotics possession law may be defined as the power
(ability) to exercise a restraining or directing influence over an ob-
ject plus the intention to exercise such power.
Because the Curzio definition states that possession is an in-
tentional control, it follows that control itself may be either con-
scious or unconscious. The person having control stands in such
a physical relation to the object that it is possible for him to im-
mediately "exercise restraining influence" over the object, whether
or not he knows of the existence of the object, or intends to exercise
his power. This concept of a control which can be unconscious, as
opposed to the intentional control that is possession, is well
shown in the following excerpt:
Control can be exercised without knowledge of the nature
or quality of the thing over which it is exercised. "Pos-
session," on the other hand, according to some defini-
tions, connotes not only physical control but also the inten-
tion to possess. The distinction can be illustrated by a sim-
ple example. If X is handed a box or an envelope he has
control not only of the box and the envelope but of any-
thing inside them, whether he knows or anticipates that
there is anything inside them or not. On the other hand,
when the question of possession arises the answer depends
on which definition of possession is used. If the definition
means [unconscious] control, then a person who is handed
a box acquires possession at the same moment at which
he acquires control, but if the definition includes the ele-
ment of knowledge, then merely handing him the box
must be supplemented by some form of knowledge of the
box's contents.' 7
See also People v. Haynes, 253 Cal. App. 1060, 61 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968).
14. Also, the word "control" itself appears in the narcotics statute both
in Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4(q) (1961), and in those
forty-five states which have adopted the UNIFORM NARCOTIC D UG ACT.
Maryland adopted the Act, but has recently replaced it with a law of
its own: MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, §§ 276-302 (1970).
15. 229 Md. 531, 185 A.2d 190 (1962). See also People v. Harper, 365
Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d 808 (1962). But see, Commonwealth v. Bozzi, 178
Pa. Super. 224, 116 A.2d 290 (1955).
16. Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 533, 185 A.2d 190, 193 (1962).
17. Goodhart, Possession of Drugs and. Absolute Liability, 84 LAw Q.
Ray. 382, 390-91 (1968).
Under the Pennsylvania narcotics possession statute "con-
trol"18 as well as "possession" is made punishable. Since "control"
is not necessarily intentional, it follows that the use of the word
"control" in the statute considerably broadens the conduct pro-
scribed. However, the cases interpreting the statute have held a
defendant to be innocent unless he is aware of the presence of
the narcotic in his control. 19 The cases normally use only the
term "possession."2  When "control" is mentioned, it is simply
treated as being synonymous with "possession. '21 Thus, the use of
the word "control" in the statute has not broadened the scope of
culpable conduct.
Despite the similarity between the Curzio definition of crimi-
nal possession of narcotics and the Restatement of Torts definition
of possession of chattels 22 there is no universal definition of pos-
session. Although broad formulations such as these may differ
only slightly, what facts must exist for the court actually to find
possession varies greatly depending on the area of law in which
the question of possession arises. 23 Possession can be usefully de-
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4 (1961).
The following acts and the causing thereof within the Common-
wealth are hereby prohibited:
(q) The possession, control, dealing in, dispensing, selling,
delivery, distribution, prescription, trafficking in, or giv-
ing of, any dangerous or narcotic drug.
19. E.g., Commonwealth v. Whitman, 199 Pa. Super. 631, 186 A.2d 632
(1963). See text accompanying note 110 infra.
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476
(1971); Commonwealth v. LaRosa, 218 Pa. Super. 203, 275 A.2d 693 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d 922 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 867 (1961); Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330,
144 A.2d 580 (1958).
21. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346
(1970); Commonwealth v. Goen, 11 Adams L.J. 82 (Pa. C.P. 1969). But see
Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 185 A.2d 190 (1962).
22. See note 12 supra.
23. The following excerpt illustrates the varied scope of "possession,"
depending on the legal context:
Take the case where "S", a servant, is sent by his master to
get a watch left with the jeweler for repair. If "S" decides to
abscond and does abscond with the watch after it has been de-
livered to him by the jeweler, "S" is not liable for theft; ... "S"
already has possession of the watch when he appropriates it and
cannot, therefore, steal it. The legal significance of the statement
that "S" has possession in this case is simply that "S" is immune
from prosecution for larceny under the circumstances. It need
hardly be said that "S" does not, under these circumstances, have
possession in the ordinary proprietary sense.
On the other hand, if "S" had received the watch directly from
the hand of his master, he would not have been said to have pos-
session in either a proprietary or a larceny immunity sense. But
in a federal prohibition case, an employee was prosecuted for the
unlawful possession of liquor which he was delivering to customers
on his master's premises .... The point is that possession was
ascribed to him for the purpose of the liquor statute and only for
that purpose.




fined, therefore, only with reference to a particular area of law.
The "possession" at issue in criminal narcotics cases is not neces-
sarily the same as that in property law.24 Accordingly, civil pos-
session cases are not material to a discussion of possession under
a criminal statute.
On the other hand, a comparison of cases arising under the var-
ious criminal possession statutes in Pennsylvania indicates that the
sort of possession required to convict is quite similar among pos-
sessory crimes. Thus the Curzio definition (power to control and
intent to control), which applied originally to possession under fed-
eral narcotics law, 2 5 has been cited in Pennsylvania cases involving
the narcotics possession statute,26 the statute making it a crime
to possess burglar's tools,2 7 and a statute concerning the unlaw-
ful possession of firearms.2 8  There is a general body of possession
doctrine in Pennsylvania which is common to all criminal posses-
sion cases. Particular requirements for possession which have
evolved in the Pennsylvania cases have been applied without any
distinction under the several statutes, notwithstanding differences
in statutory language or mens rea requirements. Thus, for exam-
ple, no distinction is made between the possesssion required un-
der the narcotics possession statute, 29 which has no mens rea re-
quirement, and that required under the burglar's tools statute,80
for which mens rea is an element.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
Although Pennsylvania law is unclear as to precisely what
24. People v. Eaves, 4 Mich. App. 457, 145 N.W.2d 260 (1966). See also
Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 MINN. L. REv. 611, 612; 24 MicH. L.
REV. 609 (1926).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1964).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4(q) (1961). See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970); Commonwealth v.
Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d 922 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 857
(1961); Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330, 144 A.2d 580 (1958).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4904 (1963).
Whoever has in his possession any. . . mechanical device, designed
or commonly used for breaking into any. . . building of any kind,
with the intent to use such tools or instruments for any of the
felonious purposes aforesaid, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4628 (Supp. 1971), amending PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4628 (1963).
No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or
about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of
business, without a license therefor. ...
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Townsend, 428 Pa. 281, 237 A.2d 192 (1968).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4(q) (1961).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4904 (1963). Mens rea is an element
conduct constitutes the possession required to convict under the
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act,8 1 it is at least certain that manual
seizure of the contraband is "possession" under the act.32 Where
the contraband is held in the hand or is upon the person of the de-
fendant, he has possession sufficient to satisfy the statute.8 3 Of
course, since the possession here must fit under the Curzio form-
ula, which includes the intent to control as well as the power to
do so, the defendant must intentionally possess the contraband on
his person. Therefore, the "unconscious possessor" (if, as a prac-
tical matter, one could ever convince a trier of fact that he was
unaware of contraband he held in his hand or had in his pocket),
who was such an enigma in the property-law doctrine of posses-
sion, 4 is-at least theoretically-easily disposed of in narcotics
possession law. An "unconscious possessor" of narcotics is not a
possessor at all.3 5
Where the defendant consciously has the contraband upon his
person there is possession. The uncertainty begins when the ob-
ject is not on the defendant's person. The question then becomes:
What conduct which is less than conscious manual seizure or hav-
ing the contraband upon the person still constitutes possession
under the statute?
A typical fact situation raising the issue of whether conduct
less than actual holding is possession is found in a recent Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court case, Commonwealth v. Florida.37 In Florida,
police were informed that a "pot party"38 was going on in a sub-
urban home; the police raided the party and found seven persons
in the gameroom, four of whom were sitting on the floor in the
center of the room. In the space between the four was an ashtray
containing several marijuana butts and an open glass jar contain-
ing loose marijuana.39 The room smelled of incense. None of the
of the offense, because the tools must be possessed with the intent to use
them for the felonious purposes listed in the statute.
31. PA. STA. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4(q) (1961).
32. See Commonwealth v. James, 202 Pa. Super. 464, 198 A.2d 351
(1964); cf. Commonwealth v. Whitman, 199 Pa. Super. 631, 186 A.2d 632
(1963); Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Suner. 371, 168 A.2d 922 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 857 (1961); Commonwealth v. Breslin, 194 Pa. Super.
83, 165 A.2d 415 (1960); Commonwealth v. Segers, 167 Pa. Super. 642,
76 A.2d 483 (1950).
33. See Commonwealth v. James, 202 Pa. Super. 464, 198 A.2d 351
(1964).
34. See, e.g., Hannah v. Peel, (19451 1 K.B. 509.
35. See text accompanying notes 19 supra, and 92 infra.
36. See Commonwealth v. James, 202 Pa. Super. 464, 198 A.2d 351
(1964).
37. 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
38. Marijuana is considered to be a dangerous drug under the Pennsyl-
vania statute. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 193 Pa. Super. 631, 165 A.2d
392 (1960).
39. At this point there is a discrepancy between the facts reported by
the superior court in their oMinion, Commonwealth v. Tirnak, 216 Pa.
Super. 310, 263 A.2d 917 (1970), and those recited in the Pennsylvania
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four were smoking any drug when the police came in, and no one
had any of the drug upon his person. On these facts, the superior
court upheld the conviction of the defendants under the Drug, De-
vice and Cosmetic Act, on the theories of joint and constructive
possession.40 In a terse opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, ap-
parently due to the insufficiency of the evidence. The Court stated
that:
Under these circumstances, the basis of the Common-
wealth's case was the legal theory of constructive or joint
possession. The Commonwealth attempts to prove this by
proof of the appellants at the scene, opportunity to commit
or join in the possession or control of the marijuana,
guilt by association, and suspicion or conjecture. Under
the particular facts and circumstances of this case this is
not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
these four defendants were guilty of the crime ... 41
The Florida case demonstrated that while there can be a finding of
culpable possession where the contraband is not on the defend-
ant's person, the particular facts of the case did not amount to such
possession.
The facts of Florida were analyzed by the court in terms of
"joint" and "constructive" possession. The important question
then is: What did the court mean by the term "constructive pos-
session," in the context of narcotics possession? The Pennsylvania
appellate courts have never completely answered this question.
There is not an appellate court in Pennsylvania discussing
the concept of the construction possession of narcotics.
There is a comprehensive discussion of this question in
an extensive annotation on what constitutes possession of
narcotics in 91 ALR 2d. 810 (1963). No Pennsylvania cases
are there noted. The present state of the Pennsylvania
law, then, seems to be that the fact finder shall consider
the totality of the circumstances of the specific case in
making the determination.
42
Supreme Court's opinion. According to the superior court, the marijuana in
the jar was only five feet from one of the four, and "within easy reaching
distance of all defendants," Id. at 314, 263 A.2d at 920; according to the
Supreme Court, no defendant was closer than eight feet to the contraband,
Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 537, 272 A.2d 476, 478 (1971). The
Supreme Court did not state what significance it saw in the discrepancy.
40. Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 216 Pa. Super. 310, 263 A.2d 917 (1970).
41. Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 537, 272 A.2d 476, 478
(1971) (emphasis added).
42. Commonwealth v. Macon, 118 Pitts. L.J. 114, 116 (Pa. C.P. 1970).
This statement, written before the Florida decision, is still true. Neither
the Supreme Court nor the superior court, in Florida, discussed the con-
cept of constructive possession or joint possession. That the annotation in-
cluded no Pennsylvania case is understandable, since it discussed the con-
Although "constructive" possession of narcotics has never been
properly defined, the concept has been frequently used to validate
convictions in criminal possession cases in this state.43  The first
case in Pennsylvania to employ constructive possession was Com-
monwealth v. Light,4 4 a case of receiving stolen goods, holding that
manual possession was not required for a finding of possession.
The earliest case still frequently cited is Commonwealth v. Segers,4 5
a 1950 superior court case which dealt with possession of burglar's
tools. Constructive possession, which originated in property law,
was therein appropriated, with certain modifications, as a tool of
the prosecutor in criminal cases.
46
A working definition of "constructive" possession as it has been
used in criminal possession cases both in Pennsylvania and most
other jurisdictions is that the defendant has the intent to control
the contraband, but the contraband is not on the person of the de-
fendant. 47  No matter how close a defendant is to the narcotic,
if it is not on his person he only possesses constructively.48 Thus
this use of the word "constructive" is inappropriate. This is not
really fictional possession. In Curzio terms, the defendant may
conceivably have the immediate power to control the object, al-
though he does not have it in his hand or his pocket. If the de-
fendant has the power of control, and the intent to control the
drug, he is by definition guilty of possession, whether or not he
has the object in hand.49 "Constructive" possession is thus used in
cept of possession under the UNIFORM NARCOTIC DRUGS ACT, in those states
which have adopted the uniform act-Pennsylvania has not.
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Whitman. 199 Pa. Super. 631, 186 A.2d
632 (1963); Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 330, 168 A.2d 922
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 857 (1961); Commonwealth v. Breslin, 194 Pa.
Super. 83, 165 A.2d 415 (1960); Commonwealth v. Dionisio, 178 Pa. Super.
330, 116 A.2d 109 (1955); Commonwealth v. Segers, 167 Pa. Super. 642,
76 A.2d 483 (1950); Commonwealth v. Winters, 118 Pitts. L.J. 288 (Pa.
C.P. 1969); Commonwealth v. Cardelli, 118 Bucks 504 (Pa. C.P. 1968); Com-
monwealth v. Yodock, 35 Northumb. L.J. 34 (Pa. C.P. 1963); Commonwealth
v. Saby, 24 Lehigh L.J. 421 (Pa. C.P. 1951).
44. 195 Pa. 220, 45 A. 933 (1900).
45. 167 Pa. Super. 642, 76 A.2d 483 (1950).
46. Within the realm of criminal possession, courts have utilized
the notion of constructive nossession in response to public pressure
for more vigorous law enforcement directed against possession of
forbidden chattels.
46 WASH. L. REV. 555. 557 (1971).
47. See, e.g., People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal. Aop. 2d 329. 65 Cal. Rntr.
651 (1968); Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534. 272 A.2d 476 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Segers. 167 Pa. Super. 642. 76 A.2d 483 (1950); State v.
Callahan. 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 26. 459 P.2d 400 (1969).
48. This is shown by Florida. Although the defendants were within
"reaching distance" of the drugs, according to the sunerior court, and the
drugs thus were subject to their power, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
identified the theory behind the superior court's disposition of the case as
"constructive"-not "actual"-uossession. Commonwealth v. Florida, 441
Pa. 534, 537, 272 A.2d 476, 478 (1971).
49. See txt accompanying notes 10 and 12 supra.
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criminal possession cases to describe situations where there is really
possession in fact.
"Constructive" possession does not mean that the defendant has
no present power to control. The defendant must have some
power to control, even for "constructive" possession.50 The de-
fendant can have power to control although the object is not on his
person. If he does have this power, and the object is not on his
person (as, for instance, where the defendant has the key to a
locked strongbox which contains the contraband) he has "con-
structive" possession, assuming that the defendant also has the in-
tent to control. To summarize, there is "constructive" posses-
sion in narcotics possession cases where the defendant intends to
control, and has some power of control, but the object is not on his
person or in his hand. "Actual" possession exists in narcotics pos-
session cases where the defendant intends to control contraband
which he holds or is on his person.51 Conviction can, of course,
be had on either basis.
III. JOINT POSSESSION
In Commonwealth v. Florida,5 2 discussed earlier, the police dis-
50. People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal. App. 2d 329, 65 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1968).
Actual possession means that the goods are in the personal custody
of the person charged with possession; whereas, constructive pos-
session means the goods are not in actual physical possession, but
that the person charged with possession has dominion and control
over them.
State v. Callahan, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 26, 459 P.2d 400, 401 (1969).
51. A few courts have defined constructive possession differently.
This minority of courts have limited the term "constructive possession"
to the situation where the contraband is not in the immediate vicinity of
the defendant:
Constructive possession is that which exists without actual per-
sonal occupation of land or without actual personal present
dominion over a chattel, but with an intent and capability to
maintain control and dominion.
Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 889 (1961). See also, People v. Fox, 24 Ill. 581, 182 N.E.2d 692
(1962).
The "constructive" possession of the narcotics cases differs substan-
tially from the constructive possession concepts in real property law. Con-
structive possession in real property law is a true constructive (fictional)
possession, in that it exists even though the possessor has no intent to
control and no power to control. The difference is shown by the following
hypothetical:
A dies, never having been in actual physical possession of a certain
piece of land, but having therein complete property. B, A's heir,
is unaware of both A's ownership and A's death and is not in
physical occupation of the land. B has constructive possession of
the land.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 7, illustration 5 at 21 (1936).
52. 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
covered the four defendants in a gameroom where marijuana was
found. Both the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme Courts char-
acterized the facts as constituting not only "constructive" posses-
sion, but also joint possession.
5 3
The concept of joint possession in criminal cases first arose
under the burglary tools statute.54 In the typical burglary tool
fact situation, two or more defendants are stopped while riding
in an automobile in which burlgar's tools are discovered. If no
person in the car actually has contraband on his person and the
contraband is in a place in the car such that all defendants are cap-
able of controlling it (e.g. not in a locked glove compartment), it
is a difficult matter for the state to prove just who had possession.
In New Yoirk a similar problem arose involving possession of un-
licensed firearms found in cars which had more than one occu-
pant.5 5 New York solved the problem with a statute that makes
every person riding in a car in which an illegal firearm is dis-
covered presumptively guilty of possession.5 6 Essentially the same
result is reached in Pennsylvania by the judicial doctrine of joint
possession,57 which avoids the obstacle of proving possession by a
particular defendant in a multi-defendant situation.
The joint possession in situations such as that in Florida, where
several defendants are in the presence of contraband but no con-
traband is on the person of any defendant, is not actual joint pos-
session, but "constructive" joint possession. The possession is "con-
53. The concept of joint possession, like "constructive" possession, was
first utilized in this state in Commonwealth v. Segers, 167 Pa. Super. 642,
76 A.2d 483 (1950). However, Segers in turn cited as authority on joint
possession two earlier Pennsylvania cases which are not actually on
point: Commonwealth v. Joyce, 159 Pa. Super. 45, 46 A.2d 529 (1946), and
Commonwealth v. Lanzetti and Lanzetti, 97 Pa. Super. 126 (1929).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4904 (1963); See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Whitman, 199 Pa. Super. 631, 186 A.2d 632 (1963); Commonwealth v. Bres-
lin, 194 Pa. Super. 83, 165 A.2d 415 (1960); Commonwealth v. Segers, 167
Pa. Super. 642, 76 A.2d 483 (1950).
55. See, e.g., People v. DiLandri, 250 App. Div. 52, 293 N.Y.S. 546
(1937) cited in Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 845, 869 (1969) (discussing joint pos-
session of unlicensed firearms under various state statutes).
56. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15 (McKinney 1967):
The presence in an automobile ... of any firearm ... is presump-
tive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such auto-
mobile at the time such weapon. . . is found....
57. See Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Townsend, 428 Pa. 281, 237 A.2d 192 (1968); Common-
wealth v. LaRosa, 218 Pa. Super. 203, 275 A.2d 693 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Schuloff, 218 Pa. Super. 209, 275 A.2d 835 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whitman,
199 Pa. Super. 631, 186 A.2d 632 (1963); Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194
Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d 922 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 857 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Breslin, 194 Pa. Super. 83, 165 A.2d 415 (1960); Common-
wealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330, 144 A.2d 580 (1958); Commonwealth
v. Segers, 167 Pa. Super. 642, 76 A.2d 483 (1950); Commonwealth v. Jung,
86 Pa. Super. 569 (1926); Commonwealth v. Goen, 11 Adams L.J. 82 (Pa.
C.P. 1969); Commonwealth v. Saby, 24 Lehigh L.J. 421 (Pa. C.P. 1951);
Commonwealth v. Winters, 118 Pitts. L.J. 288 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
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structive," in the sense that word is used in criminal possession
law, because the object is not held in the hand or on the person.
58
It is conceivable, however, that joint possession could be "actual"
physical possession as well, if the facts are varied somewhat from
those above. For example, the possession which two piano movers
have over a piano they are carrying is both joint and "actual."
The possession is joint, because both movers simultaneously possess
the same object. It is also "actual," because the object is actually
held in the hands of the piano movers. A case involving "actual"
joint possession, however, has yet to appear in Pennsylvania. This
is understandable, since joint possession was not devised to apply
where several defendants at once have hold of the contraband,59
but rather to the case where none have. In terms of the Curzio
definition, joint possession describes the situation where more than
one person have simultaneously the power to control and the in-
tent to control a common object. However, since cases of "ac-
tual" joint possession are non-existent, joint possession in practice
denotes simply "constructive" possession by several persons at
once.
IV. OTBER FACTORS BEARING ON POSSESSION
Excepting the very general Curzio definition, the courts in
Pennsylvania have not established a pattern of narcotics possession
that can be applied to every set of facts to determine with cer-
tainty whether the relationship between man and object is posses-
sory. As recently stated by the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny
County:
In the present state of the Pennsylvania law, ... the fact
finder [simply] considers the totality of the circumstances
of the specific case in making the determination. 60
However, various factors have been considered by the courts of
Pennsylvania and other states to aid in the determination of
whether or not possession has occurred. Following is a list of
these factors discussed in light of the relative weight courts have
attributed to each.
A. Quantity
One factor the courts have used to determine whether a rela-
tionship is possessory is the quantity of contraband involved. The
58. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
59. Joint possession is not needed in such a situation, because both
defendants could be convicted under normal possession standards without
resort to joint possession.
60. Commonwealth v. Macon, 118 Pitts L.J. 114, 116 (Pa. C.P. 1970).
only Pennsylvania case under the present narcotics statute61 that
considers this point is Commonwealth v. Taylor,62 decided by the
Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County. Taylor stated
that the possession of any quantity of narcotics, no matter how
small, is sufficient to convict. In arriving at this determination,
the court considered the history of the present narcotics-posses-
sion statute. The predecessor to the present act exempted from
prosecution possessors of minute amounts of the prohibited
drugs,63 but as the court in Taylor noted, the current statute omit-
ted this quantity exemption. The assumption which Taylor made
from this omission was that the legislative intent was to remove
the exemption granted possessors of minute quantities of contra-
band. 4 There is support in some jurisdictions for this view that
possession of even minute quantities of drugs is culpable, 65 how-
ever, some other state courts have taken a contrary position. 66
Possibly the most sensible position is that taken by the California
Court of Appeals in People v. Bianez.67 In Bianez the court
said that while possession of a minute quantity is not culpable
per se, the presence of a residue of the drug in the defendant's
possession is strong evidence that the defendant had at one
time possessed a useable quantity; Bianez upheld the convic-
tion on that basis. The rule of Bianez is better reasoned than Penn-
sylvania's Taylor rule that possession of any quantity, no matter
how minute, is culpable. Possession of an amount of drug so small
that it is incapable of producing a narcotic effect is not conduct
engendering the harm which the statute was designed to prevent.
Possession of such minute quantities should only be significant as
an indication that a useable quantity may have been possessed at
an earlier point in time. The rationale implicit in the Taylor rule
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780 (1961).
62. 7 Adams L.J. 24 (Pa. Q.S. 1965).
63. [Tihe word "drug," as used in this act, shall not be construed
to include . . . compounds which do not contain more than two
grains of opium, or more than one-fourth of a grain of morphine,
or more than one-eighth of a grain of heroin . . . in one fluid
ounce....
Act of July 11, 1917, No. 282, § 2, [1917] Pa. Laws 758, as amended, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780.
64. Contra, Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa. Super. 160, 188 A.2d
784 (1963), decided under the previous act, holding that possession of a
very small quantity is not a crime.
65. See, e.g., Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (1970);
Haley v. State, 7 Md. App. 18, 253 A.2d 424 (1969); State v. Young, 427
S.W.2d 510 (Mo. 1968) (holding that three miligrams of heroin is a sufficient
amount).
66. See. e.g., People v. McCarthy, 64 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1966); People v.
White, 231 Cal. App. 2d 82, 41 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1964); State v. Morgan,
287 Minn. 406, 178 N.W.2d 697 (1970) (there must be enough drug to create
a narcotic effect); Johnson v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 158, 305 S.W.2d 361
(1957) (there must be drug sufficient to be applied to the use commonly
made thereof). For decisions under the UNIFORM NARCoTIc DRuo ACT on
the question of quantity, see Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 810 (1963).
67. 259 Cal. App. 2d 76, 66 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1968).
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is that possession of a residue of drug is very strong evidence
that a larger quantity was possessed. However, the rule in effect
converts this evidence of possession into a conclusive presumption
of law that a larger amount was possessed. The Taylor rule ig-
nores situations where the defendant never possessed more than
a minute residue. Under Bianez it would be open to the defendant
to prove that he had never possessed more than the residue. Fair-
ness requires that the presumption of past possession of a useable
quantity should not be a conclusive one. If the issue arises again in
Pennsylvania the courts should reject the Taylor view, and con-
sider the rule of Bianez.
B. Duration
Another factor which bears on the issue of possession is dura-
tion. If the power and intent to control an object exist only mo-
mentarily can it be said that the object has been possessed, or
must the power and intent last for an appreciable period of time for
possession sufficient to convict to occur? The Pennsylvania view
is that the duration of possession is immaterial. 68 Courts in other
jurisdictions, however, have held that momentary possession should
be disregarded:
In short, "to possess" means to have actual control, care
and management of, and not a passing control, fleeting
and shadowy in its nature.69
An early Pennsylvania case,70 no longer cited, held that where the
defendant held a bottle of liquor which belonged to his companion
only long enough to take a swallow and pass it back again, he
could not be convicted of possessing the liquor. Similar deci-
sions have appeared in other states.7 1 However, the Pennsyl-
vania view that duration is immaterial to the issue of possession
is more in accord with the Curzio definition that possession is the
power to control plus the intent to control. When these ele-
68. Commonwealth v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 239, 273 A.2d 346,
350 (1970). Accord, Peachie v. State, 203 Md. 239, 100 A.2d 1 (1953);
Haley v. State, 7 Md. App. 18, 253 A.2d 424 (1969); Sutton v. State, 170
Tex. Crim. 617, 343 S.W.2d 452 (1961).
69. State v. Brown, 67 N.J. Super. 450, 171 A.2d 15, 18 (1961). Ac-
cord, United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1958); United States
v. Wainer, 170 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1948); State v. Cooper, 32 S.W.2d 1098,
1099 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930); State v. Puryear, 94 N.J. Super. 125, 227 A.2d
139 (1966); State v. Callahan, 77 Wash. 2d 27, 459 P.2d 400 (1969).
70. Commonwealth v. Benson, 105 Pa. Super. 123, 160 A. 243 (1932).
71. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 221 Mo. App. 148, 297 S.W. 708 (1927).
Contra, State v. Gohn, 161 Wash. 177, 296 P. 826 (1931).




Where one person physically possesses contraband as the agent
of another, the agent indisputably has possession, because con-
sciously having the contraband on the person always amounts to
possession in narcotics possession cases.7" A more difficult ques-
tion, however, is whether or not the principal, who may never
have been in the physical vicinity of the contraband, has posses-
sion. No Pennsylvania case has discussed this point since Common-
wealth v. Light,74 which involved receipt of stolen goods. In Light,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that although the defendant-
principal never had manual possession of the stolen property, he
could still be found guilty of receiving stolen goods if he controlled
the agent who had physical custody of the goods.7 5 The Light de-
cision is compatible with current doctrine governing narcotics pos-
session. Possession through an agency is possible under the Curzio
definition of possession; the principal has the intent to control the
object, and he also has the power to control by means of a human
instrumentality. The principal's possession is merely a variety of
"constructive" possession; that is, the defendant has intent to con-
trol, and some power to do so, but the contraband is not on his
person. 76 In line with this reasoning, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Maroy7  found the defendant
guilty of "constructive" possession of heroin where the defend-
ant's agent had delivered the drug to narcotics men posing as cus-
tomers.
7 8
72. The bottle passing cases have been explained on the grounds that
the defendant who takes a swallow never really had even momentary pos-
session of the bottle, State v. Jones, 114 Wash. 144, 194 P. 585 (1921). The
reasoning is that with the bottle's owner standing beside him, by whose
leave the defendant takes his drink, the defendant does not have the
power of control, in the sense that he is not free to dispose of the bottle in
any manner he desires, 194 P. at 587. This explanation is not compatible
with narcotics possession doctrine, however, because in narcotics posses-
sion, consciously holding the object is always enough to constitute culpable
possession. See text accompanying note 33 supra. Even though the de-
fendant handles the contraband at the direction of the bottle's owner, the
defendant has possession, as long as he holds the bottle. This result
does no injustice to the temporarily-possessing defendant; ownership is not
required to find possession, Munger v. State, 7 Md. App. 710, 256 A.2d 888
(1969); State v. Gohn, 161 Wash. 166, 296 P. 826 (1931). The one who
takes a drink from the bottle or a puff on the "joint" is no less culpable
than the one who passed it to him.
73. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
74. 10 Pa. Super. 66 (1899), aff'd, 195 Pa. 220, 45 A. 933 (1900).
75. Id. at 72.
76. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
77. 248 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 931 (1958).
Accord, Rodriguez v. State, 373 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
78. For a discussion of "constructive" possession by "facilitators" of
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D. Past Physical Possession
Possession of narcotics can be shown by circumstantial evi-
dence.70 In a recent Maryland case8 o the defendant had a narcotic
drug in his veins at the time of arrest. The Court of Special Ap-
peals held that merely having a narcotic in the blood is not posses-
sion because the defendant had no control over the drug in his sys-
tem, but that this fact proved circumstantially that the defendant
had had possession of the drug previously.8 ' The defendant in
the case was actually convicted, therefore, of a past possession of
the drug which terminated before the police came on the scene.
Possession can be shown by circumstantial evidence, and need
not exist at the very moment of arrest.8 2 Thus there are two
routes to conviction where the defendant did not have the contra-
band upon his person at the time of arrest: "constructive" posses-
sion may be found8 3 or circumstantial evidence can be used to
prove that the defendant had possession in the past. Another
case involving past possession is Commonwealth v. Hooe8 4 decided
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in which police saw a package,
which proved to be heroin, fly out the window of the car in which
the defendant was riding. The police then chased the defendant,
who escaped for a time but was arrested later. When he was ar-
rested the defendant possessed no narcotics. The defendant was
not seen in the act of throwing the package away, and thus
the drug was never seen on his person. 85 While the heroin was
flying through the air the defendant certainly had no power of con-
trol over it, so the officers had not witnessed a "constructive" pos-
sales of drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964), see 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 821
(1963).
79. See, e.g., People v. Haynes, 253 Cal. App. 2d 1060, 43 Cal. Rptr.
859 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968); People v. Luke, 233 Cal. App.
2d 793, 43 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1965); Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super.
330, 144 A.2d 580 (1958); Commonwealth v. Cardelli, 18 Bucks 504 (Pa.
C.P. 1968).
80. Franklin v. State, 8 Md. App. 134, 258 A.2d 767 (1969).
81. 258 A.2d at 769.
82. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 196 Cal. App. 2d 845, 16 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1961); People v. Newman, 127 Cal. App. 2d 430, 273 P.2d 917 (1954);
Commonwealth v. Jung, 86 Pa. Super. 569 (1926); cf. Rodella v. United
States, 286 F.2d 306, 311, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 889 (1960) (decided under a
statute which expressly stated that the accused must be "shown to have or
to have had possession of the narcotic drug.").
83. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
84. 187 Pa. Super. 330, 144 A.2d 581 (1958). See also Commonwealth
v. Townsend, 428 Pa. 281, 237 A.2d 192 (1968), for another instance where
"constructive" possession was confused with past possession.
85. Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330, 333, 144 A.2d 580, 581
(1958).
session. However, the court upheld the defendant's conviction. It
would appear, therefore, that the basis for the decision is that the
package observed flying from the defendant was sufficient circum-
stantial evidence that the defendant had thrown the package, and
had thus had prior "actual" possession of the drug.
In most cases where "constructive" possession is found it is
also apparent that the defendant probably had physical possession
at some earlier time. 6 It might be argued that "constructive"
possession is merely a misleading synonym for past actual posses-
sion,87 and that unless it appears that the defendant actually phy-
sically possessed the narcotics at some time, he cannot be con-
victed of possession."" However, a defendant could conceivably
have the power and intent to control at the time of arrest, without
ever having had actual (physical) possession. In one case, the de-
fendant's companion put marijuana in the trunk of defendant's car.
The trunk was locked, defendant had the key, and he knew the
drug was in his trunk. The court found that the defendant in-
tended to control the drug, and upheld the conviction.8 9 Like-
wise, in the case of "constructive" possession through agency, pos-
session is found although the defendant may never have physically
possessed the contraband.90 Therefore, although may "construc-
tive" possession cases could have been decided on past "actual" (phy-
sical) possession, physical possession, past or present, is not indis-
pensable.
E. Knowledge
Another factor which the courts have relied on in considering
the issue of possession is the knowledge of the defendant regarding
the object which he has the ability to control. Suppose that the
defendant holds a box containing a sack of marijuana, but he is un-
aware of the presence of the sack; does the defendant possess the
marijuana?91 He unquestionably has the power of control over
it. The problem is whether by intending to control the box the de-
86. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Breslin, 194 Pa. Super. 83, 165 A.2d
415 (1960).
87. It will be remembered that "actual" possession, in narcotics pos-
session cases, means that the defendant has the drugs on his person.
See text accompanying note 51 supra.
88. Possession of a narcotic is established when it is shown that a
person has physical control thereof with the intent to exercise
such control, or having had such physical control has not aban-
doned it, and no other person has that possession.
People v. Lunbeck, 146 Cal. App. 539, 303 P.2d 1082, 1083 (1956) (emphasis
added) (this is the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS definition; see note 12 supra).
89. People v. Harper, 365 Mich. 494, 113 N.W.2d 808 (1964).
90. See the discussion of possession by a principal through his agent,
notes 92, 95, 96 and accompanying text. See also, United States v. Jones,
308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d
Cir. 1961).
91. Goodhart, Possession of Drugs and Absolute Liability, 84 LAW. Q.
Rsv. 382, 390 (1968). See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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fendant can be said to intend to control the contents. In narcotics
possession the defendant is never guilty unless he is aware of the
presence of the drug.92 If he does not know that the box he holds
contains the sack of marijuana, he does not possess the marijuana.
However, the state can satisfy this requirement of proof of knowl-
edge of the presence of the contraband with circumstantial evi-
dence.9  Therefore the element of knowledge will seldom be an
obstacle to conviction if the defendant has the object on his person,
since the presence of contraband on the defendant's person is strong
evidence that the defendant knew what he had. Knowledge is
more difficult to prove in "constructive" possession cases, where
the contraband is within the defendant's power, but not on his per-
son, because these circumstances may not indicate awareness by
the defendant of the contraband's presence.
Although knowledge of the presence of the contraband is re-
quired, knowledge by the defendant of the narcotic nature of the
drug is not required in Pennsylvania 4 The superior court said
that requiring the defendant to know of the narcotic nature of the
drug would impair the effectiveness of the statute forbidding pos-
session, because of the difficulty of proving such knowledge. 95 Cali-
fornia decisions, on the other hand, hold that the defendant must
be shown to have been aware of the narcotic character of the con-
traband as well as of the mere fact of its presence.
0 6
92. An exception is the Illinois rule that a finding of possession can
be had when narcotics are discovered on premises controlled by the de-
fendant, even if there is no evidence that the defendant knew of their
presence. See text accompanying note 111, infra.
93. Commonwealth v. Tirpak, 216 Pa. Super. 310, 316, 263 A.2d 917,
920 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa.
534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
94. Commonwealth v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Gorodetsky, 178 Pa. Super. 467, 115 A.2d 760 (1955).
95. Commonwealth v. Gorodetsky, 178 Pa. Super. 467, 477, 115 A.2d
760, 765 (1955). Accord, Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d 115
(1957); Commonwealth v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970).
[T]he primary function of absolute liability is in certain circum-
stances a procedural and not a penal one. Thus there are certain
offenses that have a serious effect on public interest but which it is
difficult to prove under the usual procedure. It is then necessary
to take other and more stringent steps to wipe out the evil, even at
a minimal risk than an innocent man may be convicted.
Goodhart, Possession of Drugs and Absolute Liability, 84 LAw Q. REv.
382, 385 (1968).
96. See, e.g., People v. Gambas, 5 Cal. App. 3d 187, 84 Cal. Rptr. 908
(1970); People v. Bigelow, 104 Cal. App. 2d 380, 231 P.2d 881 (1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 910 (1952); Morrison v. State, 372 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1963). One early Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Murray, 40
Lanc. L.R. (Pa. C.P. 1926), since ignored, supports the California rule.
The defendant in Murray was a hotel employee who was told to deliver a
The California rule is the better reasoned one. Requiring a
showing of knowledge of the nature of the contraband does not
place an onerous burden upon the state, as long as this knowledge
can be established by circumstantial evidence (as can knowledge
of the presence of the drug). Facts such as the presence of ap-
paratus for administering the narcotics, 9 7 or that the defendant
was under the influence of the drug,98 or that the defendant's im-
mediate environment had all the accoutrements of a "pot party"9
would tend to show that the defendant was aware of the nature
of the drug. Absent such circumstances, the difficulty of proving
knowledge of the nature of the contraband could be lessened by
making knowledge of nature a permissible inference, or even a re-
buttable presumption, arising whenever knowledge of presence is
shown. Thus the defendant would at least have an opportunity
to prove that he in fact was not aware of the drug's nature. This
result would avoid injustice in the rare case where the defendant
had the power to control and the intent to control but was not
aware that the object was a narcotic drug.100
F. Intent
Intent is one factor which the courts have not relied on in de-
termining whether the defendant is a culpable possessor. Unlike
possession of burglary tools, where possession must be with the
intent to use the tools for certain felonious purposes, 0 1 the intent
with which a defendant possesses narcotics is immaterial. 1 2 This
follows logically from the rule that knowledge of the nature of the
contraband is not required. If the defendant does not know the
substance which he intentionally possesses is a narcotic, he ob-
viously cannot intend to use it as such; nevertheless he can be
convicted of possession. Thus in a case where the defendant dis-
covered marijuana in his apartment the day before his arrest,
and intended to destroy it the next time he went fishing, the de-
fendant's conviction was upheld, regardless of the intent with
which he possessed the drug.10 No case is directly on point in
package containing drugs to a patron; he did deliver it and received pay-
ment for it without knowledge of the contents. The court held that the
defendant was not guilty of possessing the drugs.
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 371, 168
A.2d 922, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 857 (1961).
98. See, e.g., People v. Corona, 238 Cal. App. 914, 48 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1965); Commonwealth v. Goen, 11 Adams L.J. 82 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
99. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476
(1971).
100. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d 115 (1957); Morri-
son v. State, 372 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
101. Commonwealth v. Dionisio. 178 Pa. Super. 330, 116 A.2d 109 (1955).
See also, 18 U. PITT. L. REv. 231 (1957).
102. Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d 115 (1957).
103. Locke v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 300, 334 S.W.2d 292 (1960). Ac-
cord, Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d 115 (1957).
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Pennsylvania, but there is dictum in Commonwealth v. Gorodet-
sky 0 4 stating that " [ t]he purpose of the act would be defeated if
proof of criminal intent or guilty knowledge was required .... ,05
Since Pennsylvania allows conviction without a showing of knowl-
edge of the narcotic nature of the drug it follows that intent to use
the drug as a narcotic cannot be an element of the offense.
G. Possession of Premises In Which Contraband Is Found
When the defendant is arrested in a house or apartment where
narcotics are discovered, whether the defendant has some dominion
over the premises has been considered as bearing on the question
of possession. 1116 If the defendant owns, pays the rent for, or re-
sides on the premises he is more likely to be found guilty than
if he is merely a visitor.10 7 Where the only incriminating circum-
stance is that the defendant is in physical proximity to the drug,
or has access to a place where the drug is found possession is not
proved.1 08 If the defendant is a mere visitor on the premises,
there must be some positive evidence linking him with the con-
traband. 10 9 If, on the other hand, the defendant has some dominion
over the premises, this is a circumstance which goes beyond the
fact of the defendant's mere physical proximity to the drug. Ac-
cordingly, the courts have permitted various inferences to be
drawn when drugs are found on premises controlled by the de-
fendant. Pennsylvania law is silent on the question of when the
presence of contraband on premises controlled by the defendant
amounts to possession of the contraband. In the Pennsylvania
cases where narcotics were found on premises controlled by the
defendant, no significance was expressly attributed to the defend-
104. 178 Pa. Super. 467, 115 A.2d 760 (1955).
105. Id. at 477, 115 A.2d at 765 (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970);
People v. Pugh, 36 Ill. 2d 435, 223 N.E.2d 115 (1967); State v. Chakos, 74
Wash. 2d 156, 443 P.2d 815 (1968). See also, People v. Harrington, 2 Cal.
3d 991, 88 Cal. Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961 (1970); People v. Bigelow, 104 Cal.
App. 2d 380, 231 P.2d 881 (1951); Munger v. State, 7 Md. App. 710, 256 A.2d
888 (1969).
107. See, e.g., State v. Chakos, 74 Wash. 2d 154, 443 P.2d 815 (1968);
State v. Mantell, 71 Wash. 2d 768, 430 P.2d 980 (1967); State v. Morris,
70 Wash. 2d 27, 442 P.2d 27 (1966). Cases noted in 46 WASH. L. Rsv. 555,
558 (1971).
108. Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.). cert. denied,
371 U.S. 930 (1962); People v. Harrington, 2 Cal. 2d 991, 88 Cal. Rptr. 161,
471 P.2d 961 (1970); People v. Redrick, 55 Cal. 2d 282, 10 Cal. Rptr. 823,
359 P.2d 255 (1961).
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476
(1971).
ant's dominion over the premises. The law of other jurisdictions is
in conflict on this point. Three different views exist where the de-
fendant has exclusive dominion over the premises. Also, some
courts have distinguished the situation where the defendant has
exclusive dominion over the premises from the case where his
access to the contraband is shared with others.110
The Illinois courts have accorded great weight to the finding
of contraband on the defendant's premises. According to the Illi-
nois view, if narcotics are found on premises possessed by the de-
fendant, the inference can be drawn that the defendant knew of
their presence and had possession sufficient to convict.1 1' In other
words, conviction can be had without any positive showing of
knowledge of the presence of the drug or intent to control the
drug. The rule in Washington is that if the defendant has dominion
over the premises and knows of the presence of the drug, he is
guilty of possession.' 12 This rule is not compatible with the defi-
nition of possession as the power to control plus the intent to con-
trol. The presence of the drug on premises controlled by the de-
fendant fulfills the requirement of power to control, but mere
knowledge of the presence of the drug is not equivalent to intent
to control it. Accordingly, where the drug is on the premises and
the defendant is aware of that fact, possession should be merely a
permissible inference rather than a conclusive presumption, be-
cause it is conceivable that the defendant might be aware of the
presence of the drug, yet not intend to control it. For instance,
suppose the defendant had given a party at his house and the next
morning he walked downstairs and spied a sack of marijuana on a
table, left there clandestinely by a party-goer the night before. At
that moment, the police enter. The defendant was aware of the
presence of the drug on the premises which he controlled, yet he
did not intend to control the drug. Thus, the Washington standard
is incompatible with the Curzio definition of possession which in-
volves intent to control.
The third variation is illustrated by the California District
Court of Appeals in People v. Antita,1 3 which required that
where narcotics are found on premises controlled by the defendant
there must be circumstances beyond the mere presence of the
drug on the premises which show knowledge and the intent to
110. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970);
People v. Antista, 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P.2d 177 (1954); Brock v.
State, 162 Tex. Crim. 339, 285 S.W.2d 745 (1956).
111. People v. Pugh, 36 Ill. 2d 435, 223 N.E.2d 115 (1967); People v.
Nettle, 23 Ill. 2d 306, 178 N.E.2d 361, cert. denied, 369 U.S. 853 (1961);
People v. Mosley, 265 N.E.2d 889 (Ill. Ct. App. 1971).
112. See State v. Callahan, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 26, 29, 459 P.2d 400 (1969);
cf. State v. Chakos, 74 Wn. 2d 154, 443 P.2d 815 (1968). For a discussion of
the rule in Washington see 46 WASH. L. REv. 555 (1971).
113. 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P.2d 177 (1954).
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control, in order to sustain a conviction. The rule is well-stated
in the following excerpt:
In a sense it can be said that one has possession of every-
thing that is contained in the home or apartment in which
he lives but this is not the sense in which "possession"
is used in the penal statute. In all the cases we have ex-
amined in which conviction was upheld there was some in-
criminating statement or circumstance in addition to the
presence of marijuana or narcotic which indicated knowl-
edge by one defendant of its presence and his control of
it.114
The Antista court gave as an example of an additional incriminat-
ing circumstance, from which knowledge and intent to control could
be inferred, the presence of the narcotics among the personal ef-
fects of the defendant. 115 The facts in a Texas case, Gonzales v.
State, ' provide a further illustration of the sort of additional cir-
cumstances required. In Gonzales, marijuana was found in the at-
tic of the defendant's house. A space where the marijuana lay had
been cleared of the insulation material and dust which covered the
rest of the attic floor. This additional fact supported inferences
of knowledge and intent to control."
7
If the defendant does not have exclusive access to the contra-
band on premises over which he has dominion, it is less likely
that he intends to control the contraband. Where the defendant
shares occupancy with another, or visitors are on the premises at
the time of arrest and the contraband is on a part of the premises
that the visitors had access to, the defendant may have knowledge
of the presence of the drugs and yet have no intent to control
them. This possibility was remarked in People v. Antista:"8
If [the narcotic] belonged to someone else who intended to
use it and therefore retained control and dominion over it,
and if defendant had no intention to make any use of it he
would not have legal possession of it even though it was
in his apartment.11
The courts in Illinois do not distinguish the case where access
is not exclusive, and allow an inference of possession to be drawn
from the naked circumstance of the presence of contraband on de-
fendant's premises, even though others had access to it.120 It is
114. Id. at , 276 P.2d at 179 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at , 276 P.2d at 181.
116. 157 Tex. Crim. 8, 246 S.W.2d 199 (1951).
117. Id. at 246 S.W.2d at 200.
118. 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P.2d 177 (1954).
119. Id. at ,276 P.2d at 181.
120. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 102 Ill. App. 2d 171, 243 N.E.2d
594 (1968).
submitted that the better view has been adopted in Maryland, which
like Illinois permits conviction for possession based solely on the
discovery of drugs on defendant's premises. However, in Mary-
land, where access is not exclusive different requirements arise,
as explained in Davis v. State:
12 1
It has been held that where one has exclusive possession of
a home or apartment in which . . . narcotics are found, it
may be inferred, even in the absence of other incriminat-
ing evidence, that such person knew of the presence of the
narcotics and had control of them; but where the accused
has not been in such exclusive possession, it may not be
inferred that he knew of the presence of the narcotics and
had control of them, unless other incriminating circum-
stances are shown which tend to buttress such an infer-
ence.
122
In Davis, the police found hashish in a room in the presence of the
defendant and his co-lessee. The "other incriminating circum-
stances" supporting conviction were that the hashish was in plain
sight of the defendant at the time of arrest (indicating knowledge
of its presence), and that the defendant had needlemarks on his
arm.12 Similarly, a Texas case, where drugs were found in the
defendant's rented room but the room was used daily by several
others, held that not only was evidence of the presence of the drug
insufficient to support a finding of possession, but that the de-
fendant in a case where access to the drugs is shared cannot be
found guilty unless the prosecution disproves the possibility of
possession by the others.124
In all of the Pennsylvania cases where narcotics were discov-
ered on the premises, access to the drugs was shared by several
persons. 125 Without expressly saying so, the Pennsylvania Supreme
121. 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970).
122. Id. at , 262 A.2d at 581 (emphasis added). Accord, Evans v.
United States, 257 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1958); Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967). It will be noted that the Maryland (and Florida) rule
where the accused shares dominion of the premises is the same as the rule
in California where the defendant possesses the premises exclusively.
123. 9 Md. App. at ,262 A.2d 581 (1970).
124. Brock v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 339, 285 S.W.2d 745 (1956).
In cases of this character involving possession of liquor, it has
been held that where the evidence shows an opportunity of another
or others to possess the liquor alleged to have been possessed by the
accused, the State's case, to be sufficient to convict upon circum-
stantial evidence, must disprove such outstanding hypothesis.
Id. at , 285 S.W.2d at 747. This accords with the pre-1943 Pennsylvania
rule, that where conviction is sought on circumstantial evidence alone,
the circumstances must not only point to the guilt of the defendant, but
they also must be incompatible with his innocence, Commonwealth v.
Pasco, 332 Pa. 185, 2 A.2d 735 (1938). However, the present Pennsylvania
rule does not require that the circumstances be absolutely incompatible
with the innocence of the accused, Commonwealth v. Libonati, 346 Pa. 504,
31 A.2d 95 (1943).
125. Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. LaRosa, 218 Pa. Super. 203, 275 A.2d 693 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Schuloff, 218 Pa. Super. 209, 275 A.2d 835 (1971); Commonwealth
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Court in reversing the conviction in Commonwealth v. Florida26
apparently found it to be significant that the defendant did not
have exclusive access to the marijuana.127 The Florida court held
also that the evidence was insufficient to show possession. In
Commonwealth v. Schuoff,12 8 marijuana was discovered on a couch
in the living room of the defendant's apartment. The defendant
and three visitors were asleep in the bedroom when they were ar-
rested. The Pennsylvania superior court held that the evidence
was not sufficient to convict and cited Florida as controlling but
without discussion. The only similarities between Schuloff and
Florida are that in both cases the marijuana was found on the
premises, and that several persons were present and had access to
the drug at the time of arrest. The implication arising from Flor-
ida and Schuloff, therefore, is that in Pennsylvania, as in Mary-
land, where contraband is found on premises under the domina-
tion of the defendant but the defendant does not have exclusive
access to the drug, further incriminating circumstances must ap-
pear linking the defendant with the contraband and tending to
show his intent to control it, as well as knowledge of its presence.
In cases in various jurisdictions the "further incriminating circum-
stances" have been, inter alia: needlemarks; 129 traces of the drug
in the defendant's pockets; 30 the drugs being in plain sight of
the defendant"' (which tends to establish knowledge, but not in-
tent to control); and admissions made by the defendant to the
police.
3 2
H. The "Guilty Hostess" Doctrine
A final factor that may have bearing on the question of
whether the defendant possesses an object is whether someone
other than the defendant confessed to possessing it. In Common-
v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d 922, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 857 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Jung, 86 Pa. Super. 569 (1926).
126. 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
127. This is implied by the court's emphasis in stating the facts:
"When the police officers entered the house seven people, including the four
appellants, were found in the game room." Id. at 536, 272 A.2d at 477.
128. 218 Pa. Super. 209, 275 A.2d 835 (1971).
129. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970).
130. See, e.g., People v. Haynes, 253 Cal. App. 2d 1060, 61 Cal. Rptr.
859 (1967).
131. See, e.g., People v. Harrington, 2 Cal. 3d 991, 471 P.2d 961, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1970); Davis v. State, 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970).
132. See, e.g., People v. Bigelow, 104 Cal. App. 2d 380, 231 P.2d 881
(1951); Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d 922,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 841 (1961).
wealth v. Florida,13  the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed in
a footnote that the hostess of the "pot party" at which the defend-
ants were apprehended had pleaded guilty to possession of the
marijuana." 4 Commonwealth v. LaRosa,135 interpreting Florida,
emphasized this guilty plea:
This case is controlled by the recent decision of our Su-
preme Court in Commonwealth v. Florida and compari-
son cases, which held that where the hostess of a "pot
party" pleaded guilty to possession of and using nar-
cotics, her guests who did not have marijuana on their
persons but were in the same room with and in close prox-
imity to marijuana which was in their plain view can-
not be held for the crime of possession.
13 6
In LaRosa, police found several packets of marijuana in a cabin
where eight others besides the defendant were present. One of the
packets had the defendant's name written on it. This additional in-
criminating circumstance tended to show knowledge and intent to
control by the defendant, although he shared access with the eight
others. However, one of the others pleaded guilty to possession.
The person pleading guilty in LaRosa was not the host of the
party; LaRosa thus expands the scope of the rule which it claims
Florida stands for. The rule emerging from the two decisions is
that if, in a joint "constructive" possession situation (where several
persons have access to the contraband and none have any upon
their persons), anyone pleads guilty to possession, the others pres-
ent cannot also be found guilty on circumstantial evidence. In ef-
fect, this doctrine is an attack upon the concept of joint "construc-
tive" possession, the essence of which is the presumption that contra-
band is possessed simultaneously by all those having immediate ac-
cess to it. This "guilty hostess" doctrine, emerging in Pennsylvania
as a result of Florida and LaRosa, is a recognition that although sev-
eral persons may have immediate access to contraband, possession
may be in only one.
A result similar to the "guilty hostess" doctrine is reached in
possession of unlicensed firearms cases under the New York stat-
ute:
1 37
The presence in an automobile . . . of any firearm . . . is
presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons oc-
cupying such automobile . . . except . . . if such weapon
is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein.
138
133. 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
134. Id. at 536, 272 A.2d at 477, n.2.
135. 218 Pa. Super. 203, 275 A.2d 693 (1971).
136. Id. at 203, 275 A.2d at 693. But see Commonwealth v. Pickney,
194 Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d 922, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 841 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Segers, 167 Pa. Super. 642, 76 A.2d 483 (1950) (burglary
tools).
137. N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 265.15 (McKinney 1967) (emphasis added).
138. Cf. State v. Callahan, 77 Wash. 2d 27, 459 P.2d 400, 403 (1969):
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The cases under this statute have refused to find joint possession
not only where the firearms are actually on the person of one of
the occupants, but whenever some positive circumstance tended to
show possession in one occupant in particular.
139
Thus, although the LaRosa court's "guilty hostess" doctrine is
perhaps a questionable interpretation of Florida, it is not without
parallels in the laws of other jurisdictions. The gist of the rule is
not that there can never be joint "constructive" possession, but
rather that in certain circumstances, joint "constructive" posses-
sion should not be a permissible finding. To an extent the doc-
trine counters the grab-bag aspects of joint "constructive" posses-
sion, by imposing an evidentiary restriction, in line with the es-
tablished rule that an inference of the commission of a crime
cannot be drawn from inconclusive evidence. 140 In other words,
the "guilty hostess" doctrine recognizes that an inference of
the defendant's possession of an object which is not on his
person and which others equally have access to, which arises
merely because he is in proximity to the object and is aware of its
presence, is not firmly based.' 4' Therefore, when in addition some
circumstance-such as a guilty plea-points to possession in some-
one other than the defendant, the evidence against the defendant
has become too tenuous to allow possession by him to be inferred.
V. JOINT "CONSTRUCTIVE" POSSESSION ATTACKED
A relatively stringent evidentiary standard is called for un-
der the Pennsylvania narcotics possession statute,142 because it is a
[I]t is not within the rule of reasonable hypothesis to hold
that proof of possession by the defendant may be established by
circumstantial evidence when undisputed direct proof [in Callahan,
it was a confession to possession by a co-defendant] places posses-
sion in some other person.
But see People v. DeMunn, 9 App. Div. 2d 791, 194 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1959).
139. People v. Davis, 52 Misc. 2d 184, 275 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1966); People
v. Logan, 94 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1949), modified, 276 App. Div. 1029, 95 N.Y.S.
806 (1950) (one occupant threw the gun on the back seat). See generally,
Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 845 (1969).
140. Commonwealth v. Stosny, 152 Pa. Super. 236, 31 A.2d 582 (1943).
[I]n order to warrant a conviction, the circumstances proved
should be such as reasonably and naturally to justify an inference
of the guilt of the accused, and of such volume and quantity as to
overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330, 333, 144 A.2d 580, 581 (1958).
141. Cf. discussion of the rule in some states that where possession of
premises on which drugs are found is shared, positive evidence showing
intent to control must appear in order to convict, in text accompanying
notes 118-124 supra.
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4 (1961). See note 1 supra.
strict liability statute requiring neither knowledge of the narcotic
character of the contraband possessed nor possession with any par-
ticular intent. 43 When mens rea is not an element of a criminal
statute there is more chance that an innocent defendant may be
convicted."' Joint "constructive" possession appeared originally
in this state in burglar's tools cases, under a statute which does in-
clude a mens rea element.14 5 The doctrine of joint "constructive"
possession does not comport with a stringent standard; instead, it
eases the prosecutor's burden of proof.
In United States v. Leary, ' 46 the United States Supreme Court
held that a criminal statutory presumption is unconstitutional un-
less the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proven fact from which the presumption arises. 47 The inference
of intent to control which can be drawn in joint "constructive"
possession situations is not a presumption created by statute. The
narcotics possession statutes in Pennsylvania and in other states do
not incorporate any express presumption. However, the Pennsyl-
vania case of Commonwealth v. Owens148 extends the Leary rule
to judicial presumptions.1 49 Owens held that the judicial presump-
tion that a defendant possessing recently stolen goods knows that
the goods were stolen was unconstitutional under the "more likely
than not" rule. This presumption in receiving stolen goods cases is
in fact a mere permissible inference, which may or may not be
drawn by the trier of facts. 50 Clearly then, the permissible in-
ferences which may arise in joint "constructive" possession situa-
tions are subject to the Leary standard. For instance, the Illinois
rule that permits inferences of knowledge and intent to control to
arise merely because narcotics have been discovered on the defend-
ant's premises, whether or not others have access to the contra-
band, would probably not pass muster under Leary, since the infer-
ences permitted do not seem "more likely than not" to follow from
the proved fact of the presence of narcotics on the premises. On the
other hand, Leary is probably no obstacle to the rule in some states
that where contraband is on the defendant's premises, the cir-
cumstances show that the defendant has knowledge of its presence,
143. See text accompanying notes 94 and 105 supra.
144. See Goodhart, Possession of Drugs and Absolute Liability, 84 LAW.
Q. REV. 382 (1968), discussing cases under the English Drugs Act of 1964.
145. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
146. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
147. Id. at 36.
148. 441 Pa. 318, 271 A.2d 230 (1970), noted in 75 DIcK. L. RiV. 544
(1971).
149. Id. at 326, 271 A.2d 234.
150. Commonwealth v. Joyce, 159 Pa. Super. 45, 46 A.2d 529 (1946).
"Inference is a process . . . by which a fact sought to be established . . .
is deducted as a logical consequence from other facts . . . already proved




and the defendant has exclusive access, it can be inferred that the
defendant intends to control the contraband. 5 ' If the drug is on
premises over which the defendant has dominion, and he knows the
drug is there, it is "more likely than not" that the defendant in-
tends to control it. If the defendant does not have exclusive access
to the contraband, however, it is questionable whether the mere
fact that the defendant is aware of the drug's presence makes
it "more likely than not" that he intends to control the drug. Thus
Leary, as extended by Owens, tends to support the Maryland
rule (and that indicated by Florida and Schuloff in Pennsyl-
vania)152 that where the contraband is discovered on the defend-
ant's premises, but the defendant shares access to the contraband
with others, positive evidence must appear showing that the de-
fendant is not merely aware of the presence of the drugs, but that
he also intends to control them. As for the join "constructive"
possession cases where the drug is not discovered on the defend-
ant's premises, it is of course even more questionable that intent to
control "more likely than not" flows from the fact that the defend-
ant is in proximity to the drug (along with the others) and is
aware of its presence, since the positive factor of the defendant's
dominion over the premises is absent.153 Thus it may be uncon-
stitutional to permit an inference of possession to arise in the joint
"constructive" possession situation just because the defendant is in
close proximity to the drug and the drug is in his plain sight.
In Commonwealth v. Townsend, 5 4 which involved prosecution
for possession of unlicensed firearms,155 police saw the defendant
and two others riding in a Rambler. The car stopped to let out
one of the men (not the defendant). As he stepped from the car, a
pistol fell onto the pavement. The police arrested the three men
and found a shotgun under the hood of the car and a derringer
partly hidden under the front seat. Since it was not clear whether
the defendant had been riding in the front seat or the back seat,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the defendant was not
guilty of possession of unlicensed firearms even on a joint "con-
structive" possession basis, because it was not certain that he had
been in a position to observe the guns under the front seat and
151. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 128-131 supra.
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Florida, 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476
(1971).
154. 428 Pa. 281, 237 A.2d 192 (1968).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4628 (1963): "No person shall carry a
firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person, . . . without a
license. .. "
thus have knowledge of their presence. 156 The court clearly im-
plied that the defendant would have been found guilty if it could
have been inferred that he knew the guns were present. Thus
the basic assumption underlying the Townsend decision is that
proximity to the contraband plus knowledge of its presence is suf-
ficient evidence to convict for possession of firearms, even though
persons other than the defendant have equal access to the contra-
band. The defendant's proximity to the object fulfills the Curzio
requirement of power to control, and from knowledge of its pres-
ence intent to control is inferred.
However, intent to control does not necessarily flow from
knowledge, particularly in the joint possession situation. In Com-
monwealth v. Florida5 7 this equation of knowledge of the presence
of contraband with the intent to control it was implicitly rejected.
In Florida, the defendants were in physical proximity to the mari-
juana, and the marijuana was in plain sight of all of them, so it is
certain that the defendants had knowledge of its presence. Ac-
cording to Townsend then, the defendants could have been found
guilty of joint "constructive" possession. Instead, the court in
Florida ruled that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law
to sustain the conviction. The conclusion to be drawn from the
disposition of Florida, therefore, is that incriminating circum-
stances beyond mere physical proximity to, and knowledge of,
the contraband must appear in order to convict any defendant
for possession of narcotics where several persons have simultaneous
access to the contraband. 158 And in fact the Pennsylvania courts
have disposed of the cases with a certain consistency that is not
articulated in the language of the opinions. Whenever the de-
fendant has been convicted in the joint "constructive" possession
situation, there has always appeared some additional circumstance
showing a further positive relation of the defendant to the contra-
band, beyond mere proximity plus knowledge. Examples are:
throwing away the drug at the approach of police,15 9 discarding
the drug and attempting to flee, 160 bearing needlemarks, T'' being
under the influence of the drug, 6 2 or admissions made to the po-
156. Commonwealth v. Townsend, 428 Pa. 281, 285, 237 A.2d 192, 194
(1968).
157. 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
158. However, in Commonwealth v. LaRosa, 218 Pa. Super. 203, 275
A.2d 693 (1971), the court saw the dispositive fact of Florida as being
the confession by the hostess of the "pot party." See text accompanying
note 136 supra.
159. Commonwealth v. Yaple, 217 Pa. Super. 232, 273 A.2d 346 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330, 144 A.2d 580 (1958).
160. See, e.g., People v. Corona, 28 Cal. App. 914, 48 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1965); Commonwealth v. Hooe, 187 Pa. Super. 330, 144 A.2d 580 (1958).
161. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Goen, 11 Adams L.J. 82 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
162. See, e.g., People v. Corona, 28 Cal. App. 914, 48 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1965); Commonwealth v. Goen, 11 Adams L.J. 82 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
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lice.163 Thus although the courts have discussed the fact situations
in terms of joint "constructive" possession, convictions have been
sustained only when there was evidence which indicated that the
defendant had had past "actual" (physical) possession.1
6 '
There is one Pennsylvania common pleas case, Commonwealth
v. Macon,165 in which the result is inconsistent with this unspoken
doctrine. 166 The facts provide a good illustration of the type of
case where the outcome would be changed by requiring evidence
of intent to control, rather than merely of knowledge of the pres-
ence of the contraband. In Macon, five men were in a one-room
apartment; two were injecting heroin, and two others had heroin
in their pockets when the police arrived. The defendant was in
the room, but was not injecting any drug and had none on his per-
son. Narcotic apparatus was strewn about. The Common Pleas
Court of Allegheny County held that the evidence was sufficient to
convict. In this case there was proximity plus knowledge, but
since no further incriminating circumstance existed to show intent
to control (or that the defendant had had past physical posses-
sion), possession by the defendant should not have been found.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mens rea is not an element of the narcotics possession statute
in Pennsylvania. Therefore, to counter the danger of convicting
innocent defendants, the standard of evidence sufficient to prove
163. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pickney, 194 Pa. Super. 371, 168 A.2d
922. cert. denied, 371 U.S. 841 (1961). In many burglary tool cases, an
additional incriminating circumstance, as remarked in Commonwealth v.
Whitman, 199 Pa. Super. 631, 186 A.2d 632 (1963), is that all the defendants
are engaged in a joint enterprise:
The defendant and his two friends left their home community
in Ohio "late in the evening" and were picked up by the police
during the night in Allegheny County, approximately a hundred
miles away. They said they were driving from Warren. Ohio to
Cumberland, Maryland to look for work, but apparently the judge
did not believe this. They were on a joint venture, whether it was
going to Cumberland to seek employment, or whether it was
going to commit a burglary and break open a safe. The appellant
cannot put himself into the class of cases where two persons
intent on crime invite an innocent friend to join them for a ride in
their automobile.
Id. at 635, 186 A.2d at 634. Other burglary tool cases where the defendants
seem to have been engaged in a joint venture are: Commonwealth v. Bres-
lin, 194 Pa. Super. 83, 165 A.2d 415 (1960); Commonwealth v. Segers,
167 Pa. Super. 642, 76 A.2d 483 (1950); Commonwealth v. Saby, 24 Lehigh
421 (Pa. C.P. 1951).
164. This is true only for joint "constructive" possession, not for mere
"constructive" possession. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
165. 118 Pitts. L.J. 288 (Pa. C.P. 1970).
166. Macon was decided before Florida, however.
possession should be a strict one. The concept of joint "construc-
tive" possession, which permits conviction without evidence show-
ing intent to control, increases the danger, since where the defend-
ant has a shared access to contraband it is easily possible that he
does not intend to control the contraband, even if he knows of its
presence.
The Pennsylvania appellate courts have not expressly dis-
carded joint "constructive" possession, but the continued survival
of the concept in this state is doubtful. Although the court in
Commonwealth v. Florida'6 7 continued to speak in terms of "joint"
and "constructive" possession, the disposition of the case showed
that when access to the drug is joint, evidence beyond proximity
to, and knowledge of, the drug is required to convict. This is in
accord with those jurisdictions that distinguish between exclusive
access to the contraband and shared access in cases where the de-
fendant has dominion over the premises on which the drug is
found.1"" The "guilty hostess" doctrine, as developed by Com-
monwealth v. LaRosa, 69 prevents the operation of joint "construc-
tive" possession doctrine whenever a co-defendant pleads guilty.
Furthermore, the inference of intent to control when the de-
fendant does not have exclusive access, but is in proximity to the
drug and knows of its presence, may be unconsitutional under the
Leary rule 70 as expanded by Commonwealth! v. Owens.17'
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania courts should discard
completely the notion of joint "constructive" possession of nar-
cotics. They should expressly require (as the cases have done in
fact) that in order to support a conviction in the joint possession
situation, the circumstances must positively indicate an intent to
control or past "actual" possession by the defendant.
1 72
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167. 441 Pa. 534, 272 A.2d 476 (1971).
168. See text accompanying notes 119 and 122 supra.
169. 218 Pa. Super. 203, 275 A.2d 693 (1971).
170. See text accomoanying note 147 supra.
171. 441 Pa. 318, 271 A.2d 380 (1970). See text accompanying note
149 supra.
172. This Comment does not suggest that joint "constructive" posses-
sion also be discarded in burglary tool and receiving stolen goods cases
in Pennsylvania. Since these offenses, unlike narcotics possession, have
mens rea elements, the evidentiary standards need not be as strict.
